

Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SPECIAL SUMMARY NUMBER 11: TELEGRAPHIC SUMMARY

1.PORTUGAL -- EMERGING OPPOSITION TO NEW GOVERNMENT

(FROM EUR/IB)

THE APPOINTMENT OF AZEVEDO AS PRIME MINISTER AND GONCALVES
AS ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF HAS GENERATED STRONG
OPPOSITION FROM MODERATE FORCES AND ENDORSEMENT FROM
COMMUNIST ALIGNED ELEMENTS. EVIDENCE OF RESISTANCE TO THE
NEW GOVERNMENT WAS PROVIDED BY:

--REFUSAL OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
GOVERNMENT IN SPITE OF A REPORTED OFFER OF MAJORITY
CABINET REPRESENTATION;

--REPORTED ADAMANT OPPOSITION OF PPD TO GOVERNMENT:

--ANTUNES NINE OPPOSITION AND REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE LEGAL
AUTHORITY OF GONCALVES;

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--OTELLO INSISTENCE THAT COPCON BE SUBORDINATED TO

PRESIDENT AND NOT GONCALVES;

--NATIONAL GUARD/PUBLIC SECURITY POLICE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT GONCALVES AS CHIEF;

--REFUSAL OF ALL NORTHERN MILITARY UNITS LESS THREE TO RECOGNIZE GONCALVES AUTHORITY;

RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT MAY TAKE THE FORM OF POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN LISBON OR POSSIBLE MILITARY MOVES. MILITARY UNITS ARE ON STATE OF ALERT. EMBASSY ASSESSES POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY MOVE FOR OR AGAINST GONCALVES IN LISBON AS RELATIVELY LOW, BUT SAME CONSTRAINTS ON ARMED ACTION MAY NOT OBTAIN IN NORTH. ANTUNES NINE HAS RAISED POSSIBILITY OF NORTHERN INSURRECTION, THOUGH THEY INITIALLY PREFER POLITICAL ACTION (WHICH HAS BEEN INEFFECTIVE THUS FAR).

ON GOVERNMENT SIDE, NEW PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO REPORTEDLY THREATENED SOCIALIST LEADER SOARES WITH ARREST FOR HIS REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT. SOARES CONSULTED WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY ON HIS NON-PARTICIPATION DECISION. AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR SEPARATELY ENDORSED SOARES' MOVE. SOARES AND OTHER MODERATES OPINED THAT GONCALVES AS CHIEF OF STAFF REPRESENTED BLOW TO PORTUGAL'S NATO TIES. SEVERAL MODERATES HAVE REQUESTED URGENT WESTERN DEMARCHES TO COSTA GOMES STRESSING IMPACT OF GONCALVES APPOINTMENT ON NATO TIES.

NEXT MOVE MAY INVOLVE ATTEMPT BY MODERATES TO RESTRUCTURE ARMED FORCES ASSEMBLY, WHICH MEETS SEPTEMBER 5. IN MEANTIME, GONCALVES, USING NEW MILITARY AUTHORITY, MAY PRESS MILITARY REASSIGNMENTS.
(SEE ITEM 4 OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY)

2. DISHARMONY OVER PROSPECTIVE OPEC PRICE INCREASE?

IRANIAN INTERIOR MINISTER AMOUZEGAR TOLD THE PRESS IN CARACAS THAT OPEC WILL NOT PRESS FOR THE 20 PERCENT PRICE INCREASE CONDITIONS MERIT. COMMENTING ON THIS, THE SAUDI CHARGE POINTED OUT:

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--AMOUZEGAR INITIALLY PRESSED FOR 35 PERCENT BUT RAN INTO VENEZUELAN OPPOSITION TO ANY INCREASE BEYOND 10-15 PERCENT.

--EVEN 10-15 PERCENT RUNS COUNTER TO SAUDI ARABIA'S ADAMANT OPPOSITION TO ANY PRICE INCREASE.

(SEE ITEM 1 OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY)

3. SPAIN

A. SPAIN SEEKS GREATER US INVOLVEMENT IN SAHARA

FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY ROVIRA COMPLAINED TO DCM EATON THAT THE US WAS LEANING TOWARD MOROCCO DESPITE US STATEMENTS OF NEUTRALITY. HE ARGUED:

--THE US FAILED TO SUPPORT SPAIN'S IDEA AT THE UN FOR A QUADRIPARTITE CONFERENCE.

--THE US COULD CONTROL KING HASSAN SINCE HASSAN HAS NOWHERE ELSE TO TURN, BUT SO FAR IT HAS NOT EVEN WARNED HASSAN TO CEASE HIS PROVOCATIVE MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE SAHARA.

--WALDHEIM HAS SO FAR MADE ONLY PRO FORMA GESTURES, AND WILL DO NOTHING FURTHER WITHOUT A PUSH FROM THE US.

ROVIRA ALSO EXPRESSED DISAGREEMENT WITH MOROCCO'S CALL TO EXPAND ANY CONFERENCE ON THE SAHARA TO INCLUDE LIBYA AND TUNISIA AND REPEATED SPAIN'S POSITION THAT IF VIOLENCE IN THE SAHARA IS NOT LIMITED SPAIN WILL SPEED UP ITS WITHDRAWAL.

B. SPANISH POSITION ON TREATY DURATION NOT FIRM

EMBASSY MADRID BELIEVES THAT SPANISH INSISTENCE ON A THREE YEAR BASE AGREEMENT IS MORE A NEGOTIATION TACTIC THAN A MATTER OF ACTUAL SUBSTANCE. THEIR FINAL POSITION ON THE TREATY'S DURATION WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON WHAT
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IMPACT THEY FEEL THE TOTAL AGREEMENT WILL HAVE ON DOMESTIC OPINION.

4. RHODESIA-ZAMBIA-SOUTH AFRICA

A. VICTORIA FALLS: TALKS ON TRACK--ANC TOTTERS

EMBASSY LUSAKA REPORTS THE CONTENTS OF A CONVERSATION WITH ZAMBIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR MARK CHONA IN WHICH HE DESCRIBED THE PROCEEDINGS AND OUTCOME AT VICTORIA FALLS:

--MUZOREWA NEGOTIATED VERY BADLY FOR THE ANC, ACCEEDING TO ALL BUT ONE OF SMITH'S POINTS IN LESS THAN HALF AN HOUR.

--THE ANC IS SUFFERING FROM A LEADERSHIP CRISIS, WHICH THE ZAMBIANS, FRELIMO, AND OTHER OBSERVERS HOPE CAN BE CONTAINED UNTIL A SETTLEMENT IS REACHED.

--KAUNDA'S COACHING OF MUZOREWA BOLSTERED THE ANC POSITION AND RESULTED IN PROGRESS TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

ZAMBIA IS NOW "LETTING THE DUST SETTLE," WHILE REMINDING SMITH VIA THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT HE MUST MAKE REAL CONCESSIONS. KAUNDA IS SEEKING BRITISH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ANC.

B. KAUNDA AND VORSTER MEET

AFTER A YEAR OF EXCHANGING MESSAGES KAUNDA AND VORSTER MET FOR THE FIRST TIME DURING THE VICTORIA FALLS TALKS. EMBASSY LUSAKA REPORTS THAT:

--VORSTER DECLARED THAT HE WAS "MOST IMPRESSED WITH KAUNDA."

--KAUNDA'S ADVISORS SAY THAT IF THE TWO LEADERS COULD "GET RHODESIA OUT OF THE WAY, NAMIBIA MAY RESOLVE ITSELF-ONE ANGOLA IS ENOUGH."

(SEE ITEM 3 OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY)

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5. MRS. GANDHI'S INDIA BLOWS WARMER THAN COLD

EMBASSY NEW DELHI NOTES THAT THE INDIANS, WITH MRS. GANDHI TAKING THE LEAD, HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF FAVORABLE GESTURES TOWARD THE US IN THE PAST MONTH. WHILE THEY ARE BALANCED IN PART BY A VARIETY OF UNOFFICIAL AND OCCASIONALLY OFFICIAL SLURS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, THE TREND IS POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH TENTATIVE AND SUBJECT TO INSTANT REVERSAL. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS:

--IF MRS. GANDHI IS SOLICITING, WHAT SHE SEEKS IS UNCLEAR.

--SHE IS UNLIKELY TO JEOPARDIZE APPARENTLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

--WHILE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT POSSIBLE INCREASED CHINESE INFLUENCE IN BANGLADESH, NOTHING THERE SO FAR WOULD IMPEL HER TO SEEK IMPROVED TIES WITH THE US.

6. PORTUGAL REFUSES TO ALLOW INDONESIAN MILITARY INTO
TIMOR

EMBASSY JAKARTA LEARNED FROM THE AUSTRALIANS THAT
PORTUGAL'S SPECIAL ENVOY HAD AGREED THE INDONESIANS COULD
INTERVENE MILITARILY IN TIMOR UNDER DIRECTION OF A FOUR
POWER GROUP WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN EMPOWERED TO TAKE ANY
STEP NECESSARY TO END THE FIGHTING.

--HOWEVER, PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES REPUDIATED THE PACT,
APPARENTLY OUT OF RELUCTANCE TO ALLOW THE INDONESIANS THE
SOLE RIGHT TO ACT MILITARILY ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP.

THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED A
PRESS STATEMENT ACKNOWLEDGING PORTUGAL'S SOLE
AUTHORITY ON TIMOR AND IMPLYING THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT
ACT UNILATERALLY.

7. ANGOLAN REFUGEES TO ZAIRE?

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PRESIDENT MOBUTU TOLD SENATOR CLARK THAT HE HAD RECENTLY
INFORMED PORTUGAL AND LEADERS OF THE THREE LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS THAT ZAIRE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCOMMODATE
ALL WHITE REFUGEES WHO WISH TO SETTLE IN ZAIRE. MOBUTU
CLAIMED THAT WITH THE MONEY NOW BEING PROGRAMMED FOR
THE AIRLIFT HE COULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD
EASE THE REFUGEES INTO THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY IN AN ORGAN-
IZED WAY. SO FAR HE HAS HAD NO RESPONSE. INGERSOLL

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